Introduction
Today's technology base is becoming increasingly large and complex. Networks are growing, and applications are being migrated from centralized systems to client-server environments.
In addition, organizations are connecting their networks to those of other organizations and to the Internet at a rapid rate [Network 96]. All of this added complexity presents a challenge to administrators who are responsible for managing these systems. The growth in the number of networked systems has accelerated demand for qualified administrators, and the increasing complexity of networked systems has raised the threshold of expertise required of these administrators. At the time of the birth of the Internet, systems administrators were typically wellversed and experienced in the technology they were charged to manage. There is ample evidence that the average level of expertise demonstrated by the fast-growing number of systems administrators today is considerably lower, and insufficient to allow them to configure and manage their complex systems in a survivable manner. This lack of adequate expertise is seen daily at the CERT ® Coordination Center. 1 The continuing growth in the number of courses, seminars, and conferences directed at managing technology in the Internet environment reflects heavy demand for training and development in network systems administration skills. At the same time, a quick look at popular press publications reveals that many organizations now provide business products and services over the Internet, and that they are becoming increasingly concerned about the security and reliability of their technology. All these observations illustrate a dangerous gap between the need to secure systems and the supply of individuals capable of implementing adequately secure information technology environments.
1.
CERT is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
The CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) is located at the Software Engineering Institute. Sponsored in part by the United States Department of Defense, the CERT/CC is chartered to work with the Internet community in detecting and resolving computer security incidents, and taking steps to prevent future incidents.
One way to bridge this gap is to provide hardware and software tools (hereafter simply referred to as tools) to assist administrators in their efforts to provide adequate security. Indeed, there are a number of tools available today to help manage networked systems, aid in protecting systems, monitor network activities, and respond to security events. However, these tools are not documented using consistent terminology, and there is no standard way to evaluate and select tools. It is often left up to individual administrators to sort through them and select, based on their own expertise, tools that may be appropriate for their specific environment.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an approach to support decision making about which tools are appropriate for the survivability needs of a given networked systems environment.
On a broader level, we hope that software developers will implement tools targeted at providing the functionalities described in this paper, and that commercial vendors will market their products using the vocabulary of functionalities in our lexicon. We believe that this work can serve as a foundation for further developing and formalizing the description, classification, analysis, and selection of tools to support system survivability.
In section 2, we briefly review some methods currently used to characterize and select among existing security tools. Existing techniques tend to be informal and often do not provide much insight into the applicability of tools to meet specific security objectives. In section 3, we present a new lexicon of security functionalities. We then use these functionalities in a procedure to link security policies to tools. The special vocabulary only applies to functionalities that are useful when considering the security and survivability of information resources, and does not cover functionalities that have no direct security bearing. Section 4 examines two common security problems to illustrate how the functionalities may be used to identify tools for addressing specific attack methods. Finally, in section 5, we review our approach, discuss issues raised during its development, and suggest areas for future development.
Tool Characterization and Selection Methods
Several methods have been proposed in the literature to characterize and guide selection of security tools. Popular texts on Internet security topics often discuss specific uses of wellknown security tools, and include appendices listing tools grouped by similar areas of use. Web sites of commercial software companies portray tools in a variety of ways. Some tool characterizations are evident in the ways archival sites on the Internet have chosen to arrange their collections. In this section, we will briefly discuss a few examples of such sources examined during development of our approach.
In the NIST special publication, Guide for Selecting Automated Risk Analysis Tools [Gilbert 89 ], Gilbert lists data collection, analysis, and output of results as the three modules that should be present in any automated risk analysis tool. This represents a purpose-specific (in this case, for risk analysis) description of the input-processing-output model by which any tool may be characterized. Gilbert also describes site-specific selection criteria. Among these she includes hardware and software compatibility, methodology (whether the tool performs a quantitative or qualitative analysis), reporting requirements, documentation, history and security features, utility and ease of use, training and technical support, and cost. These criteria represent qualitative measures by which selection can be made between otherwise apparently acceptable tools.
Missing from a selection process based on such criteria are answers to two more fundamental questions: (1) "Is this the right tool for the problem" and (2) "Is the problem the correct one to be solved?" With respect to selection of tools for survivable systems, our approach begins to address these more fundamental issues by providing a common vocabulary of functionalities. These functionalities may be used to characterize solutions to security objectives, and then to identify sets of tools that serve to meet the objectives. Once the objectives have been met, then selection among the sets identified can be made based on parameters such as cost, efficiency, flexibility, and so forth.
In A Guide to the Selection of Anti-Virus Tools and Techniques [Polk 92 [Chapman 95 ]. They group tools in the following categories: authentication, analysis, packet filtering, proxy systems, daemons, and utilities. The first four of these may easily be described by the functionalities they serve: authenticating, auditing or integrity-checking, filtering, and proxying. The daemon category lists security-enhanced tools that operate in place of vendor-supplied programs. In this way they provide a substituting functionality by providing the same services, but in a more secure manner. The utilities category lists a number of other tools that serve a variety of functionalities. The different categorization methods used in these two books further illustrates the lack of uniformity in characterizations of common security tools in the literature of the field. Several other texts simply list tools alphabetically by name, which may be convenient for looking up information about a specific tool, but does not provide insight regarding functionalities provided by tools.
To explore security tool characterizations and categories currently used within the vendor community, we surveyed a broad range of web sites on the Internet. Among web sites of commercial software producers [e.g., Sun 96, Microsoft 96, TIS 96a, DEC 96, Cisco 96b], almost all vendors list their products alphabetically by name within market categories they define for themselves. Some provide a list of their products ordered by release date. A few, e.g., [Cisco 96a] highlight products oriented specifically toward security purposes. At one web site we visited, the term "security technology" is used in a way that suggests that the listed items are stand-alone software modules when they are in fact different capabilities implemented within a single operating system product. Functionalities provided by commercial products are rarely evident without careful examination of associated documentation, which is often not available on-line. We believe that web sites such as these could be made considerably more useful if products could be listed (and identified in search engines) by the security functionalities they provide. 
Summary
Existing methods for selecting tools do not sufficiently examine the issue of whether or not the correct tool is being selected or if the right problem is being solved. Current classifications of tools are diverse, and provide varying degrees of insight into the specific functionalities served by each tool within a given group. This makes it difficult to identify and compare tools to suit the needs of a particular security objective in a specific environment. Nevertheless, we can determine a set of basic functionalities by drawing upon elements from existing methods, characterizations and categorizations, and examining them in light of established security principles and strategies. As we will see in the following section, these functionalities represent the building blocks used to describe solutions to specific security objectives.
Security Tool Identification Approach
Before appropriate security tools can be identified and selected, an organization must conduct a comprehensive examination of its security needs. The organization must know, and have documented, all of its current and anticipated information assets, and the infrastructure in which these assets are stored and communicated. Policies must be clearly defined regarding expectations and responsibilities for physical, personnel, and networked systems security, and the relationships between them. The organization must define expectations about how information is communicated between internal and external entities. As the needs and activities of an organization change with time, it is imperative that knowledge about the organization's information assets, infrastructure, personnel, and policies be kept up-to-date and consistent with one another. The organization must also maintain current knowledge about the kinds of security problems to which their information assets, infrastructure and personnel may be susceptible. Once these preparations have been completed, and procedures put in place to maintain the currency and accuracy of policies and knowledge of the organization, then specific security objectives may be defined for each information asset and service.
To establish a common vocabulary between security objectives and the specification of tools selected to meet those objectives, we have generated a lexicon of security functionalities. These functionalities represent primitive actions that support information survivability. We intend the lexicon to be small, yet comprehensive in its coverage of the primary security activities that any organization may need to employ over the lifespan of its information technology infrastructure. The functionalities span a variety of purposes within efforts to protect information assets and services, detect security-related activities, and respond to security events.
The approach we propose uses these functionalities in a procedure to link organizational security requirements to tools. These security functionalities are used to map security objectives to tools and in this way provide a direct line from an organization's security policies to the tools that are required by administrators to support those policies. The approach may be used to systematically analyze an organization's information assets and services, or to analyze specific security problems involving particular information assets or services.
Security Functionalities
The functionalities described in Table 3 -1 represent specific activities associated with common security objectives. They cover a broad range of purposes and were derived from a variety of sources. A number of functionalities are suggested by existing selection and characterization methods (see section 2). We also identified functionalities exhibited in currently available security tools. To survey terminology used by authors and vendors of existing security tools, we examined the installation, configuration, and user documentation provided with 120 commercial, shareware, and freeware products. The sample of tools included those for use with Microsoft operating systems (MS-DOS, Windows 3.x/95/NT), Apple MacOS, and a variety of UNIX-based systems. The tools surveyed represent a broad range of solutions, from password-prompting screen-locks to network monitoring agents and robust firewall construction packages. From the myriad of features, purposes and implementations described in the documentation, we derived a number of common functionalities served among clusters of these tools. In addition, hypothesized security needs and solutions for security issues not yet implemented in available tools were considered. To complete the lexicon, we analyzed a number of current attack methods and extracted functionalities that supported the prevention, detection, or response to the attack methods.
Some functionalities are complementary to one another, some are defined in terms of others, and the remaining functionalities may be considered independently. Tools can exist to provide a single functionality, part of a functionality, or to encompass several functionalities. To prevent bias in establishing contexts for their use, we have deliberately avoided grouping the functionalities into categories. Functionalities that appear to have similarities between them have been collocated in the table to facilitate comparison between their definitions.
The definitions assume no particular implementation, context, or scope of deployment. For example, an organization may determine a need to hide an entire subnet, a specific host on a network segment, parts of a storage volume, or specific fields within a data structure in active memory. It may need several such objects hidden in completely different areas of the network environment. Alternatively, all these objects may reside in one area of the network environment, but the users or processes from which the objects are to be hidden may be different.
Functionality Activity Security Purpose
Hiding Placing a data resource where it cannot be discovered to prevent unauthorized access to that data resource.
Encrypting
Translating data in its original form into an unintelligible (encrypted) form to protect the data from being read by unauthorized users or processes.
Decrypting
Translating data in encrypted form back into its original form to allow authorized users or processes to read the data.
Locking
Making a data resource accessible only to the lock holder until it is unlocked to prevent modification of the data resource by others while it is locked.
Limiting Setting an upper bound on system resources that may be consumed by an agent or process to maintain availability of those system resources for other agents and processes.
Reserving Setting a lower bound on system resources that will be available to an agent or process to provide a minimum guaranteed quantity of system resources to that agent or service. 
Shielding
Creating a barrier to keep undesirable activity away from specified data resources or processes.
Containing Confining a data resource or process
(1) to prevent transmission of the data resource or process out of the confinement area.
(2) to protect external resources or agents from undesirable effects of the data resource or process.
Authenticating
Proving that an agent is who or what the agent claims to be to establish confidence in the identity of the agent, often as a prerequisite to subsequent access.
Access Controlling Granting access to data resources only to authorized agents or processes to prevent access by unauthorized agents and processes.
Enforcing
Controlling the sequence, direction or route of access or processes to ensure that agents and processes operate as required by security policy.
Tunneling
Transmitting data formatted for one protocol in a container of a second protocol to convey the data in a more secure manner by employing the second protocol.
Obliterating Disposing of data in a manner that assures that it can never be restored from the medium on which it was stored to ensure that the medium can be reused or disposed of without risk of disclosing the data it previously contained.
Eradicating
Obliterating every instance of an item to ensure that no further access is possible to any instance of that item.
Replicating
Providing multiple copies of a data resource to maintain availability of that resource.
Functionality Activity Security Purpose Although the functionalities described above identify activities with specific security purposes, they may, depending on deployment scope and purpose, be interdependent and may themselves have security implications. For example, a replicating functionality may induce a requirement to protect all of the copies generated of a data resource. If security objectives are left incompletely covered, intruders may be able to circumvent even the most comprehensive of solutions implemented elsewhere in the network environment. It is therefore imperative that the identification of functionalities associated with a security objective be as precise and comprehensive as possible.
Tool Identification Procedure
Identifying that a functionality is required will arise from the organization's knowledge of its security goals, security problems it expects to defend against, activities it will observe and record, and actions it intends to take in response to security events. Where the functionality is required will be determined as the organization systematically examines all of its information assets and services, and the context of their implementation.
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, the organization must identify its information assets and services, and their corresponding security requirements. Once the security objectives for each information asset and service have been defined by the organization, tools to support the objectives can be identified using the following procedure:
For each information asset or service X, for which tools are to be identified, do the following:
1. Given the security objectives for X, select functionalities from Table 3-1 that support the objectives for that asset or service.
2. Define the implementation context for X. This will include the system and network environment in which X resides or is used. Table 3 -1) they support and the implementation context in which they operate.
4. Identify candidate tools that support functionalities identified in step 1, and that operate within the implementation context defined in step 2.
Select those tools that together provide all the functionalities required by X.
This procedure can be applied to a single information asset or service, or it can be comprehensively applied to all information assets and services. When it is applied to all information assets and services, the set of functionalities identified will be the total set required by the organization as a whole. Since most organizations already have significant installed technology bases, this procedure will often be used to analyze existing information assets and services. However, this procedure is also useful for planning the addition of new information assets and services.
The set of functionalities identified in step 1 will often be those that support the well known requirements of confidentiality, integrity, and availability but may also include those that support the maintenance of those requirements (e.g., monitoring, logging, auditing, etc.). The richness of this set may depend on the comprehensiveness of the organization's policies, and an alert administrator may identify either a weakness or absence of required policies as he scans the table of functionalities and selects those that match stated objectives.
Step 2 is necessary because it provides operational constraints that must be considered when selecting tools. A tool that provides a specific set of functionalities is of no use if the operational context is different from that of the information asset or service for which the tool is be considered.
Upon completing steps 1 and 2 of the procedure, an organization will have documented a collection of required functionalities and a description of the implementation context for each information asset or service for which it is selecting tools. The next task is to map that set of functionalities to one or more tools.
In order to select tools to support functionalities, the tools must be identified and then described in terms of the functionalities they support as well as the context in which they operate (step 3). At present, such standard descriptions don't exist. Until such standard descriptions do exist, it will be the job of the administrator to evaluate tools in terms of the functionalities they support. For example, Tripwire [Kim 93 ] could be described as providing auditing, integrity checking, and reporting. To define the set of functionalities supported by a specific tool, the administrator will need to review the accompanying documentation and possibly install and test the tool (since documentation is often incomplete). Once the tools are described in terms found in Table 3 -1 along with their operating context, selecting candidate tools is a straightforward task.
The set of candidate tools (step 4) is comprised of all tools that provide at least one of the required functionalities, and that operate within the same implementation context as the information asset or service. From this set, one or more tools are then selected that, together, will satisfy all of the functionalities required (step 5). In some cases, a single tool per functionality may suffice. In general, however, it is likely that a variety of permutations of tools may be identified, in which each tool cooperates with others to provide the necessary coverage of functionalities in the required areas. Each permutation that provides the required coverage represents a set of tools that together define a solution. If no arrangement of available tools will provide the required coverage to implement the functionalities, further analysis will be needed to determine how to address the gap. For some organizations, customized solutions may need to be engineered. For other organizations this may mean changing the underlying technology (implementation context) supporting the information asset or service in order to take advantage of existing tools. In the worst case, the organization may have to accept the risks of not providing the missing functionalities.
Selection among multiple solution sets may be made based on criteria such as efficiency, flexibility, ease-of-use, cost, and the availability of technical support.
Summary
In this chapter we have proposed a set of descriptive terms, functionalities, and a method for using them to identify tools needed by administrators to support organizational security policies. In this way, we have demonstrated a method to translate security policies to supporting tools. The proposed procedure highlights the need for organizations to comprehensively develop security policies and for tools to be characterized in a uniform, consistent manner. This procedure can support the evaluation of competing solution sets based on functionality of existing tools as determined by the richness of the security functionalities they support. In addition, the analysis performed when mapping organizational security objectives to these functionalities and then to tools may indicate opportunities to improve the environment's existing configuration for long-term survivability, robustness, and manageability.
Identifying Functionalities to Counter Common Attack Methods
As a consequence of the technologies and protocols employed in implementation contexts, there exist context-specific vulnerabilities that may require the implementation of additional security functionalities. Intruders often exploit newly-discovered vulnerabilities in an attempt to circumvent existing security measures that organizations have implemented. It is therefore imperative that organizations keep up-to-date with security information relevant to their information infrastructure. As new vulnerabilities are discovered, vendors and incident-response organizations produce reports 1 detailing workarounds and patches to address such vulnerabilities.
To illustrate how an organization may identify additional functionalities to address specific network security problems, we will explore two well known attack methods. Security functionalities that serve to prevent, detect and respond to these problems will be identified, along with contexts in which such functionalities may appear in a typical network environment. For simplicity, we will assume that assailants attempting to disrupt or gain access to an organization's internal network are doing so from some external site. For organizations in which there is concern of attack from within the organization's boundaries, the internal network should be interpreted as the part of the organization's infrastructure (a single department or subdivision) to be protected. It is assumed that precautions implemented to protect against assailants may be placed between the assailant and the target systems. 
Denial-of-Service
As its name suggests, this form of attack is aimed at preventing a targeted system from providing, receiving or responding to network services. Current attacks typically operate by flooding one or more services on the target with connection requests or queries. The services on the target become overloaded, disabling their ability to respond to legitimate service requests, and in some cases, the target system is forced to shut down completely. Alternatively, an assailant may take advantage of a flaw in the implementation of a service to disrupt or disable that service on the target host.
Prevention
Unfortunately, attacks of this sort are difficult to prevent, in part because the purpose of providing services in the first place is to allow legitimate clients to make use of them. Verifying that requests for service are from legitimate clients requires a strong authenticating process for each request. This authentication should not rely solely on network data such as host IP addresses or information provided by domain name services, since such information may be spoofed by an assailant, and is therefore unreliable. One solution is to employ cryptographic authentication protocols [Kaufman 95, p .184], which incorporate an encrypting functionality to protect the confidentiality and integrity of authentication dialogues.
Flooding attacks are successful because more service requests can be sent to a service host than it can process within a short period of time. Hence a limiting functionality is necessary to simply refuse or ignore any more requests than services can handle within a given period. Similarly, the service hosts should be protected against being forced to shut down by reserving a minimum of system resources necessary to keep them up and running.
To minimize the effects of denial-of-service attacks, one should configure each host to offer and respond to as few services as possible. All unused and unnecessary services (e.g., echo, chargen, finger, tftp, uucp) should be disabled and removed. If possible, different services should be implemented on separate hosts, in order to reduce the susceptibility of a service to an attack launched upon another service operating on the same host, i.e. containing the effects of a denial-of-service attack against one service to protect other services. In addition, one should shield services of a host by installing proxying agents for each of the services. Such agents may be designed to inspect and authenticate requests for service, filter out those that are malformed or fail authentication, and then pass only the qualified requests to the appropriate service host. If different proxying agents are installed to serve different constituencies of clients, then a denial-of-service attack reaching one proxying agent will not affect service to clients from the other constituencies.
Several tools exist to permit greater security, control and auditing of services. For UNIX systems, tools such as Wietse Venema's TCP wrappers [Venema 96a ] package and the netacl utility in Trusted Information System's Firewall Toolkit [TIS 96b] may be used to pre-and post-process transactions with services to inspect, authenticate, filter, monitor, log, and report service activities.
An additional strategy for minimizing the effects of denial-of-service is to maintain a distributed capacity for services. This is achieved by replicating a service across several independent systems so that an attack against one system does not wipe out all availability of that service.
Detection
In order to be able to respond to a denial-of-service attack, one must be able to observe and react to suspicious traffic on the network. Network monitoring capabilities with secured output channels (to avoid tampering of the output) should be installed to permit logging and notification about significant network traffic and events. Such monitoring not only serves to allow detection of anomalies, but also facilitates auditing of network and host configurations. As depicted in Figure 4 -2, network monitors should be placed strategically so that their output may be compared to verify configuration and operational assumptions.
Response
Given a sufficiently robust environment, one may also choose to implement a dynamic, retreating facility, by which systems will automatically react to bursts of service requests, or to other suspicious activity, by temporarily disabling affected areas until the burst or other activity subsides. This strategy, however, only serves to protect the target systems themselves. By forcing a system to react by disabling itself, the denial-of-service is achieved, and therefore the attack succeeds. Nevertheless, it is generally a good practice to implement self-defensive mecha- 
IP Source Address Spoofing
This attack method attempts to gain access to a target host by assuming the identity of a host trusted by the target. The assailant will often inhibit traffic from the genuine trusted host by means of a denial-of-service attack against it, and then attempt to gain access to the target host using the trusted host's identity. In the case of hosts on a TCP/IP network, the identity assumed by the assailant is the trusted host's IP address.
Prevention
Prevention of source address spoofing attacks, as with denial-of-service, comes down to having some way of reliably authenticating the hosts making connection attempts. Again, methods for implementing such authentication should not rely solely on information from domain name services or network addresses, which spoofing attacks abuse to masquerade as trusted hosts. Reusable passwords must be transmitted in strongly encrypted form. Connections should be periodically reauthenticated during each session, to guard against hijacking due to a compromised session. For added security once a session has been established, all communication between hosts should also be strongly encrypted. An example of a tool which implements such cryptographic authentication and transmission protocols is Secure Shell (SSH) [Ylonen 96a, b] .
In addition to reliable authentication, it is helpful to shield trusted hosts, to whatever extent is possible, against denial-of-service attacks. For organizations that do not require Mobile-IP accessibility across their firewalls, packet filtering precautions (see [CA-96.21]) may be implemented at an organization's firewalls to keep out connections from external sources that attempt to masquerade as trusted internal hosts. Similarly, to prevent source address spoofing attacks originating from within an organization's internal network, one must contain outgoing packets that have source addresses not belonging to genuine internal hosts. This can be achieved by filtering outgoing packets at the organization's firewalls to ensure that their source addresses are only those from internal hosts. For TCP/IP networks, addresses reserved for private intranet use [Rekhter 96 ], and loopback addresses in the 127.x.x.x range should also be filtered (incoming and outgoing) at the organization's firewalls, since packets with these source addresses should neither be arriving from external hosts nor leaving the internal network.
Detection
Since IP spoofing attacks are typically preceded by a denial-of-service attack, the monitoring functionalities described earlier also apply in this case. In a network environment where the packet filtering precautions described above have been applied, characteristics of network packets on a given segment of the network are predictable by virtue of their source and des-tination addresses. Monitoring functionalities implemented for each pair of gateways between network segments may be coordinated to log suspicious packets, and activate a notifying functionality to alert the appropriate response processes and personnel in the organization.
Another way to identify IP spoofing activity is to audit the process accounting logs of hosts within the organization's network to verify that connections made to each host are matched by connection attempts from the corresponding hosts. If the process accounting logs show a connection made without a corresponding connection attempt from the alleged source host, then the connection may have been achieved via IP spoofing. This is often the only means to track IP spoofing activity that occurs within the confines of an internal network, since the host from which the spoofing attack was initiated is behind the organization's firewall.
Response
If an IP spoofing attack is detected by a network monitoring and notification mechanism, one could trigger a retreating functionality to isolate affected systems by shutting down their external connections. Alternatively, the retreating functionality might be implemented upstream at the network filters themselves, with a dynamic filter adjustment capability to block only the suspicious traffic while allowing other network activity to continue. A dynamic capability such as this would minimize broad-scale disruption of service due to a single suspicious event.
If systems are discovered to have been compromised, integrity-checking functionalities will need to be initiated using untainted media to determine the extent of damage. Restoring functionalities may then be used to return affected systems to a state known to be correct.
Summary
The existence of context-specific vulnerabilities requires implementation of additional security functionalities. Despite existing security measures that organizations have implemented, intruders may be able to disrupt or gain access to systems and services by exploiting newly-discovered vulnerabilities. To illustrate how an organization may identify additional functionalities to address specific network security problems, functionalities for preventing, detecting, and responding to denial-of-service and IP spoofing attacks were presented. The increasing sophistication of intruder attack methods, as observed by the CERT/CC's incident handling and vulnerability analysis experts, underscores the importance of maintaining an organization's knowledge of potential security problems to its information infrastructure, and its ability to identify and implement additional security functionalities as needed.
Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a standard lexicon to describe the basic activities that are needed to address the survivability needs of information assets and services. These functionalities can be used to map the security requirements of assets and services to specific tools. The functionalities listed in Table 3 -1 cover a broad range of purposes and represent a starting point for the further exploration of this area. As people use these terms in the specification of their tools, they may discover gaps, ambiguities or redundancies in the vocabulary. We encourage such exploration and welcome the enrichment of the vocabulary.
The selection of tools based on functionality requirements is currently a time-consuming task primarily because existing tool developers do not use standard terminology to characterize their products. If tools makers in the future will adopt the proposed vocabulary and use it to describe the nature of their products, the evaluation of tools will be made much simpler since the mapping process will be more direct. To provide immediate assistance, we encourage current product vendors and interested parties to describe existing tools in terms of the vocabulary. Not only will this be a test of the vocabulary itself, it will also demonstrate functionalities for which there are few or no tools available. These gaps would represent opportunities for future development efforts.
As tools are characterized using the standard vocabulary of functionalities, we encourage the recording of the procedures used to accomplish the characterizations. In this way, the knowledge of how to characterize the tools can be shared and the activity can become more widespread.
The table of functionalities currently does not include arguments to the terms. For example, the term filtering is included but not what to filter or where to filter. Future research efforts are needed to fully qualify the gerunds by providing the context for their use. However, such qualification based on today's technology might be restricting and would surely need to be revised regularly as newer technologies emerge.
In order to further develop both the lexicon and the tool selection procedure, we recommend that a series of case studies of increasing complexity be initiated. The results of such case studies would support the following:
a. improvement of the vocabulary b. refinement of the procedure c. determination of which steps in the procedure would be candidates for automation
The current procedure, if applied to a number of information assets and services simultaneously, may result in a number of solution sets. The task of choosing the optimum solution from this set for a given security context could be difficult. Knowledge-based tools such a an expert system could aid in this challenging task.
Another avenue for future work involves the certification of tools for the functionalities they provide. Two aspects are important: 1) does the tool provide a given functionality, and 2) the strength and comprehensiveness with which the functionality is implemented in the tool. A reasonable starting point might be a simple yes/no notation (a 1,0 scale) to indicate whether or not the functionality is present. Later, this could be expanded to a scale that would represent both the presence and the strength of the functionality.
Until our technology base is without flaw there will be an ongoing need for tools to support the survivability needs of our information assets and services. This paper represents a starting point in the quest to formalize the description, classification, analysis, and selection of tools to support that information survivability.
